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The year 1980 began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continued 
through the noisy but confused Western response, which was inhibited by the 
Iranian hostage crisis and the developed world's energy dependence on Middle 
Eastern supplies. Soviet intentions seemed suddenly more threatening and the 
Alliance took stock of its defences and found them wanting. In the Far East, 
wars between communists of varied allegiance continued, with refugees being 
used as political weapons, a technique which was adopted by Fidel Castro when 
he unloaded his human liabilities on to the United States. The war between Iran 
and Iraq seemed to possess the almost unique distinction of being inspired by 
neither superpower, while posing a threat to Gulf stability and oil supply. 
Resistance in Afghanistan prevented the Soviet Union from closing the 
embarrassing chapter written by that intervention, and resistance of another 
kind in Poland presented further dilemmas for the Politburo. These events have 
created a keener awareness in the West of the needs to coordinate a response 
and to develop a policy for the future. Wiser and perhaps sadder, the smaller 
members of the Alliance are looking anxiously towards the new Administration 
in Washington, half hoping for stirring leadership, half dreading it. 
Hopes are centered around the prospect of a mature, well balanced United 
States foreign policy that neither ignores nor overstates the danger from the 
East, that remedies deficiencies in defence procurement and preparedness 
without excess of militaristic zeal, and which recognizes the competition 
between the two major power blocs as essentially one of ideas, vitality and 
accomplishment, rather than of military power. Dread arises out of the possi-
bility of initiatives aimed at "quick fix" solutions to the East-West problem by 
the methods of systems analysis, high technology and confrontation diplomacy. 
The Alliance is looking for leadership that stabilizes the power balance and then 
steers the conflict away from the brink of war. 
Four years ago the International Institute for Strategic Studies described the 
Soviet Union as "economically uncompetitive, culturally repressive and ideo-
logically increasingly barren", and went on to assert that "her primary claim to 
global power and influence is military might".1 The intervening years have 
underlined every word. If the weaknesses of the USSR outnumber her strengths, 
are we not playing into our opponent's hands by allowing her to dictate the 
choice of weapon? By leaving the initiative for too long in Soviet hands, the 
West has done little but respond to a series of cautious and intelligent military 
moves directed from Moscow. Too often, these actions have caught us off our 
guard, wrong-footed and divided. By the skilful use of propaganda, a weapon 
the West seems to have tacitly agreed to forgo, the Soviets have often managed 
to round off a direct or surrogate military victory by winning the competition for 
apparent moral superiority, particularly in the eyes of Third World audiences, 
and has even succeeded in making the West feel guilty. The Alliance needs to 
gain the initiative by diverting the main clashes in the conflict between East and 
» 
West away from military confrontation into such arenas as economics, political 
activity, culture and ideas, thus reducing the risk of full-scale war and improving 
our chances of success. Provided we develop the conventional strength to hold 
our positions in Europe and the Middle East, and at the same time deter conflict 
at high intensity, the final outcome between West and East may be decided 
through performance. To some extent, at least, this competition will occur in the 
Third World, particularly among the poorer nations. 
At the start of this century the world contained some two billion people. 
Today there are 4.3, and by the year 2000 there will be about 6.3 billion.2 
Already many of these souls lack food, opportunity and hope. Marxist propa-
ganda tries to attach blame for the emerging tragedy onto the West even though, 
having failed to provide adequately for its own populations, the communist 
system does almost nothing to alleviate Third World suffering. The West cannot 
solve this problem simply by accepting liability and giving charity, and any 
crusade with that intention would likely fail, giving rise to an economic Vietnam 
with all its guilt-ridden consequences. But this does not mean that we should do 
nothing. The United States is a revolutionary nation founded upon the notion 
that all men are created equal, being entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. The union of liberal political institutions and a free enterprise 
economy which these principles have produced is sometimes uneasy, but it has 
nevertheless provided the most direct road to a better life. Having accomplished 
the revolution internally, the United States and her allies may need to mobilize 
these ideals a second time, for the wider benefit. The Carter Administration was 
idealistic, but its capacity to act in accordance with Western principles was 
uncertain, and its good intentions were therefore doomed to failure. Our ability 
to compete must be underpinned by an understanding of and confidence in our 
own system, which hostile propaganda has been allowed to erode. The creation 
of a strong sense of commitment on the part of the West is the most important 
and challenging task facing the new Administration. With confidence and 
cohesion, the Alliance should be able to resist Soviet pressure, direct competi-
tion away from military confrontation, and lay the foundations for a more equit-
able distribution of wealth between North and South. Failure could be serious. 
The hungry, humiliated and alienated nations of the world, equipped as inevit-
ably they will be with weapons of mass destruction,3 may eventually destroy 
capitalism and communism with singular indifference. 
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1. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1976 (London, 1977), p. 3. 
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3. See Jane House, "The Third World Goes Nuclear", in South, no. 3, 3 Dec. 1980, pp. 31-35. (The 
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